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NONLAWYER LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Alex J.Hurder*
INTRODUCTION

ONLAWYER legal assistance is a necessary ingredient of any
plan for meaningful access to the courts. The American Bar Association Commission on Nonlawyer Practice found in 1995 "that as
many as 70% to 80% or more of low-income persons are unable to
obtain legal assistance even when they need and want it."' While lowincome households have the greatest problems of access, 2 many moderate-income
households, as well, do not have access to the justice
3
system.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain an overly
broad ban on assisting the unauthorized practice of law4 that discourages judges and lawyers from working with nonlawyers to make courts
accessible to the public. Nevertheless, courts, lawyers, and individuals
committed to meaningful access to justice are finding new roles for
nonlawyers in the legal system.
In Rutherford County, Tennessee, for example, the nonlawyer court
advocate of the Domestic Violence Program, Inc., assists pro se petitioners in obtaining orders of protection. A Domestic Violence Court
Advocacy Protocol, signed by the local judges, the local bar association, and the District Attorney General, enables the court advocate
who is not a lawyer to accompany victims of domestic violence to
court, to sit with them at counsel's table, and, at the discretion of the
judge, to assist the court with other duties including answering docket
calls and communicating relevant information to the judge.5
The role of the court advocate may be active. The court advocate
helps pro se petitioners prepare petitions for orders of protection,
prepares final orders and agreed orders under the supervision of the

N

* Associate Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; A.B.
Harvard University, 1967; J.D., Duke Law School, 1975. I am grateful to Robert Belton, Rebecca L. Brown, Zona F. Hostetler, and Mary W. Wrasman for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Commission on Nonlawyer Practice, American Bar Ass'n, Nonlavyer Activity
in Law-Related Situations 77 (1995) [hereinafter ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer
Practice].
2. See id. at 75.
3. See id.at 73-78.
4. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998) ("A lawyer shall
not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the
bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.").
5. See J.S. Daniel et al., Domestic Violence Court Advocacy Protocol (1996) (on
file with the author).
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ordering judge, prepares pro se petitions for contempt, and assists victims with the preparation and filing of subpoenas for witnesses and
vital records when necessary. 6
Similarly, in New York City, where most tenants in Housing Court
are not represented by lawyers,7 the City-Wide Task Force on Housing
Court, Inc., places nonlawyer volunteers in the Housing Court of each
borough to assist defendants in housing cases.' A staff person in each
borough coordinates nonlawyer volunteers who maintain information
tables in each courthouse.9 When asked for assistance, the volunteers
explain the procedures of Housing Court, the warranty of habitability,
and other aspects of landlord-tenant law.10
The program has received much support. The local bar association,
recognizing the plight of unrepresented tenants in Housing Court,
supports the program."' Moreover, judges and court clerks refer unrepresented tenants to the information table. Occasionally, judges
even call on experienced nonlawyer volunteers from the City-Wide
Task Force to summarize cases and suggest dispositions.'
The activities of the nonprofit community organizations in Tennessee and New York fill a need that is not being met by lawyers. Victims
of domestic violence have their personal safety and security at stake in
every hearing on a petition for an order of protection. 3 Defendants
in Housing Court face the loss of property, disruption of family, and
possible deprivation of constitutional rights when they appear at a
hearing without a lawyer.1 4 In a system that does not guarantee lawyers, the help of nonlawyer volunteers is invaluable.
Despite their value, vital programs like these might constitute unauthorized practice of law in many jurisdictions.' 5 Most states have statutes imposing civil and criminal penalties on the unauthorized practice
of law.' 6 In particular, Rule 5.5 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct supports the sweeping prohibition in these statutes by
making it unethical for a lawyer to "assist a person who is not a mem6. Id.
7. Telephone interview with Angelita M. Anderson, Executive Director of the
City-Wide Task Force on Housing Court, Inc. (August 18, 1998). The City-Wide Task
Force on Housing Court, Inc., is a not-for-profit coalition of community housing
organizations.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses
and Client Power, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 481, 500-01 (1996) (discussing the threats to a woman's personal safety and legal rights when she "acts to free herself from the battering relationship").
14. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process,20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533 (1992).
15. See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
16. See ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 1, at 119.
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ber of the bar in the performance
of activity that constitutes the unau17
thorized practice of law."'
The comment to Rule 5.5 notes that the definition of the practice of
law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but adds: "Whatever the
definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects
the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.""8
The American Bar Association Commission on Nonlawyer Practice
issued a comprehensive report with recommendations in 1995 after
conducting nationwide hearings on nonlawyer practice.19 In its report,
the ABA Commission indicates that the primary goal
of unauthorized
2
practice rules is to protect the public from harm. 0
To achieve this goal of protecting the public, the ABA Commission
recommended regulation of law-related nonlawyer activities that pose
a risk of harm to the public. 21 Further, it recommended the prohibition of law-related activities by nonlawyers only if regulation cannot
effectively protect the public. 22 The Commission concluded:
A regulatory approach for nonlawyer activity may be needed if the
activity presents a serious risk of harm, if consumers cannot protect
themselves against that risk because they will find it difficult or impossible to evaluate the nonlawyer service provider's qualifications,
or if the likely benefits of regulation outweigh the likely negative
consequences of regulation .... The activity should be prohibited if
no regulatory approach will
effectively accomplish an appropriate
23
level of public protection.
To determine the appropriate level of regulation, the ABA Commission suggested an analytical approach to the varied forms of nonlawyer activity.24 Regulatory options advanced by the Commission
included protective legislation, as well as registration, certification,
and licensing by agencies other than courts.'
Professor Deborah Rhode has also argued in a series of articles that
unauthorized practice rules are an unnecessary and ineffective means
of protecting the public. 26 In addition to their ineffectiveness, Profes17. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998).
18. Id. Rule 5.5 cmt. 1.
19. See ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 1,at xiv-xv. The Com-

held hearings in ten cities from 1992 through 1994 and conducted extensive
research into the provision of legal assistance in the United States and Canada. Id.
20. See id. at 126-30, 136-40.
21. See id. at 137.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 136-42.
25. Id. at 142-50.
mission

26. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policig the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutional
and EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,34 Stan. L Rev. 1, 79

(1982) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly] (pointing out that lay
representatives have practiced successfully before many administrative agencies);
Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Non-
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sor Rhode argues that the rules infringe on First Amendment rights
through their vague and overbroad prohibitions.2 7
Professor Rhode suggests that nonlawyers should only be excluded
from law-related activities if three considerations favor the restrictions. She writes:
If, as the ABA Commission and other bar leaders consistently maintain, our primary goal in regulating nonlawyer practice is to serve
the public interest, then three considerations become critical. What
are the risks and benefits of lay competition in the legal services
market? What is the best
way to minimize these risks? Who should
28
make such decisions?
According to Professor Rhode, these three considerations weigh towards permitting nonlawyer involvement in the legal system. Yet, the
first consideration, the risk of harm to the public, does not fully account for the state's interest in requiring that some tasks be performed
exclusively by lawyers. The needs of the legal system itself must be
examined before setting limits upon the ability of nonlawyers to perform law-related activities. These needs become clear when examining two related aspects of the legal system: the judiciary's need to
control the exercise of judicial power and the need for judicial accessibility to individuals.
The judiciary is a government branch of limited powers. Through
its decisions it resolves disputes and makes law. The power of the
courts to make law is exercised both at the state and the federal level
by deciding cases and controversies.2 9 The cases and controversies are
initiated by individuals, not by the courts." Indeed, the integrity of
the judiciary requires that courts decide only cases brought by individuals with standing to bring them." As a result, courts have a correlawyer Practice,22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 701, 710 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode,
Professionalism in Perspective] ("[Ihf consumer protection is our true objective, the
current system is poorly designed to achieve it."); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of
Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209, 230 (1990) [hereinafter
Rhode, Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers] (arguing that the risk of nonlaw-

yer practice to consumers has been overstated).
27. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 26, at 74-96; see
also Rhode, Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, supra note 26, at 231 ("Con-

cerns about incompetent or unethical assistance also can be addressed by measures
short of prohibiting all lay practice.").
28. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 26, at 707.

29. See K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 72-75
(1960) (describing how the common law doctrine of precedent works); Christopher J.
Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312, 312 (1997) ("Courts
making law are constrained by the process of participatory decision making-the production of judicial decisions through voluntary, self-directed debate among
litigants.").
30. See Peters, supra note 29, at 435.
31. See id.

[W]hen adjudication operates as that process often, perhaps even usually
does, according to the common law method that it has known for centuries,

1999]

NONLAWYER LEGAL ASSISTANCE

2245

sponding need to ensure32access for those individuals with standing to
bring cases of all types.
This Article weighs the state's interest in the orderly operation of
the legal system against the need for accessibility and concludes that
some law-related activities would benefit from nonlawyer participation and do not require proscribing or regulating nonlawyer participation. Nevertheless, it finds there are strong arguments for regulating,
and in some cases prohibiting, nonlawyer participation in other lawrelated activities.
This Article contends that the ethical obligations of confidentiality,
candor, competence, and loyalty imposed on lawyers by the courts
contribute to the orderly operation of the legal system.3 3 It also suggests that courts have a duty to exercise heightened care when litigants without lawyers rely on assistance from nonlawyers who are not
subject to the ethical obligations imposed by the courts.
Some writers have recommended transferring responsibility for regulating lawyers and nonlawyer legal assistance from the judiciary to
legislative or executive agencies.' 4 They have argued that regulation
of lawyering through licensing and court-imposed ethical rules has
been an inefficient means of achieving the objectives of regulation.3,
This Article contends that the responsibility of the judiciary to guarantee the orderly operation of the legal system within bounds set by the
Constitution and common law tradition requires the courts to retain
primary responsibility for regulating lawyers and nonlawyer legal
assistance. 6 Because the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
some of the specific law-related activities engaged in by nonlawyers,
regulation of nonlawyer activities devised by legislative and executive
it brings with it the ingredients of a truly democratic legitimacy. And it tells
us that all we have to do in order to sustain that legitimacy in adjudication is
to preserve the common law features that produce it: resolution only of actual controversies; fact-specific, case-by-case adjudication; initiation and
control of lawsuits by affected parties; and narrow application of stare
decisis.
Id
32. See infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 228-38 and accompanying text.
34. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L
Rev. 801, 873 (1992) (recommending use of a combination of legislative, executive,
and judicial agencies to regulate lawyer conduct); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 335, 407 (1994) (suggesting that Congress might eventually have to promulgate ethical rules for lawyers).
35. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 822-30 (doubting that the current disciplinary
system for lawyers can be effective); Zacharias, supra note 34, at 345 ("Disparate state
professional rules result in confusion and an inability of lawvyers to follow each jurisdiction's mandates.").
36. David Wilkins has examined the impact of various regulatory schemes on the
responsibility of the judiciary to remain independent. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at

853-58.

2246

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

agencies is subject to judicial review to guarantee compliance with
constitutional mandates.37
Part I of this Article examines the First and Fourteenth Amendment protection afforded to law-related activities of organizations
with primarily political and social goals. It reviews cases in which the
Supreme Court has found that state unauthorized practice of law rules
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This part also discusses the two standards of review that have evolved for law-related
speech and association with primarily political or social goals versus
activities with primarily commercial goals. It draws on Supreme
Court cases that established the right of civil rights organizations, civil
liberties organizations and labor unions to encourage and sponsor
lawyer-conducted litigation that advanced the groups' interests, and it
argues that First and Fourteenth Amendment protections should also
apply to other organizations with primarily political and social purposes that encourage and assist litigation by providing nonlawyer legal
assistance to litigants without lawyers.
Part II reviews the types of governmental interests that have been
advanced to justify restrictions on the law-related activities of lawyers
as well as nonlawyers. It suggests that the Supreme Court has shifted
the focus from the government's interest in protecting the public from
harm to its interest in the operation of the legal system.38
Part III explores two aspects of the governmental interest in the
operation of the legal system. It examines the need of courts to limit
the exercise of judicial power to the cases of litigants with standing
and the corresponding need for courts to be accessible to individuals
with cases of all types.
Part IV recommends that courts and the bar undertake an analysis
of specific law-related activities to determine whether the regulation
or prohibition of nonlawyer participation violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This part begins such an analysis by asking the
three questions suggested by Professor Rhode as they relate to the
operation of the legal system. It does not attempt a corresponding
analysis of the government's interests in protecting the public from
harm.39 It first asks what are the risks and benefits to the operation of
the legal system of allowing nonlawyer participation in specific lawrelated activities. It then discusses ways of minimizing threats to the
operation of the legal system that are less restrictive than prohibiting
unauthorized practice of law. Finally, it discusses who should decide
whether regulation is needed and how to provide it.
37. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 Hastings L.J. 577, 652-55 (1989); Gary
A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 559, 595-610 (1992).
38. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
39. See Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective, supra note 26, at 707.
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FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF LAW-RELATED ACTIVITIES

The Supreme Court has long recognized the conflict between rules
banning unauthorized practice of law and the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech, association, and petition of government
for redress of grievances.4' Early cases rejected the arguments of
state bar associations that the governmental interest in protecting the
public from harm justified broad bans on41speech and collective activity aimed at gaining access to the courts.
The Court has applied two different standards of scrutiny to First
Amendment challenges to state regulation of lawyers and the law-related activities of nonlawyers. On the one hand, the Court has held
that organizations with primarily political and social purposes have a
fundamental right to engage in speech and cooperative activities
aimed at facilitating access to the courts for individuals with legitimate
claims.42 Therefore, the Court has ruled that rules prohibiting such
activity must withstand strict scrutiny by reviewing courts.4 3 On the
other hand, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to rules curtailing law-related activities that have the primary purpose of advancing the commercial interest of the speaker-a standard more
deferential to the state." Here, when defending regulations governing commercial speech and association, state agencies must advance a substantial governmental interest and demonstrate
that the
45
regulations are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Although both tests require an inquiry into the governmental interest at stake, courts have failed to develop a clear picture of those interests in their decisions under this test. But, significantly, in Florida
Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,' the Court appears to have recently changed
the focus of its governmental interest inquiry from interest in avoiding
harm to the public to the government's own interest in the operation
of the legal system. 47 The new shift in emphasis is significant for the
analysis of unauthorized practice of law rules.

40. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580-86 (1971), United
Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 221-25 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.

415, 444-45 (1963).
41. See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 221-25; Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8.

42. See infra notes 48-95 and accompanying text.
43. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-33 (1978).

44. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995).
45. See id.
46. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).

47. See id. at 631 n.2.
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The Right of Organizations with PrimarilyPolitical and Social
Purposes to Encourage and Sponsor Litigation

In NAACP v. Button,4 8 the Court held that the First Amendment,
applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protected the
NAACP's campaign to end public school segregation by encouraging
and sponsoring litigation.49 In Virginia, lay members of the NAACP
recruited parents and children to meetings at which NAACP staff lawyers explained the legal steps necessary to desegregate public schools
and passed out printed forms authorizing the NAACP staff lawyers to
represent the signers in desegregation cases.5" The NAACP paid its
staff attorneys a modest per diem fee for their work on cases and reimbursed their expenses. 1 The staff lawyers were not permitted to
receive any other compensation, and there was no cost to the client.5"
NAACP policies limited the types of cases it would finance, but actual
conduct of the sponsored litigation was under the control of the lawyers. 3 The Virginia courts held that the NAACP campaign violated
the state statute forbidding the practice of law without a license,54 the
solicitation of business for a lawyer by a layperson or organization,5
and "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business"
by a lawyer. 6
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the activities
of the NAACP and its legal staff were "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments .. .
The Court reasoned that to the NAACP, litigation was a form of political expression, and that, "under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances." 58
The Court also found the Virginia statute to be impermissibly vague
and overbroad. 59 Observing that a statute curtailing First Amendment rights as little as possible could be valid if it served a compelling
government interest,6" the Court concluded that Virginia had not advanced an interest sufficient to justify the broad prohibitions of its
statute.61
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).
See id. at 428-29.
See id. at 421.
See id. at 420.
See id. at 420-21.
See id. at 421.
See id. at 418.
See id. at 423-26.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 430.
See id. at 432-36.
See id. at 438.
See id. at 432, 438, 444.
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The following year, the Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Virginia,62 upheld the First Amendment rights of a union that assisted its members with legal claims. 63 Here, the union's members and
staff contacted members who were injured on the job, told them that
they had the right to sue for compensation, and urged them to consult
a lawyer recommended by the union. 64 The Virginia State Bar
claimed that nonlawyer union members who gave injured members
advice about their legal rights and urged them to initiate legal action
were engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 65 The bar also
claimed that the local lawyers who accepted the cases and charged the
clients fees were engaged in improper solicitation of legal business
and aiding the unauthorized practice of law. 66
Although the cases of the injured workers did not appear to have
the political significance of the desegregation litigation protected in
Button67 and the commercial interest of the lawyers who received the
referrals was more pronounced, the court still recognized the union's
rights. Indeed, the Court found that
the right of the workers personally or through a special department
of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on-is an inseparable part of this constitutionally
guaranteed right to assist and advise each other. 68
The court also extended the First Amendment protection to the
lawyers who accepted employment under the plan.69 The Court explained that "what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and ethical
fabric of the administration of justice."7

Similarly, three years later, in United Mine Workers, District 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n,7 1 the Supreme Court held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protected the union's right to hire lawyers
on salary to assist members in asserting their legal rights. 2 In this
case, the union employed a licensed attorney on salary to represent its
62. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
63. See id at 8.
64. See id at 5.
65. See id at 2.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 10 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Personal injury litigation is not a form of
political expression, but rather a procedure for the settlement of damage claims.").
However, Justice Clark's description of personal injury litigation overlooks the power
of courts to make law through the interpretation of statutes and the development of
common law doctrines. See Peters, supra note 29, at 361-66.
68. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6.
69. See id. at 8.
70. Id. at 6.
71. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
72. See id at 221-22.
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members in worker compensation claims.73 In doing so, the union
told the staff lawyer, "your obligations and relations will be to and
with only the several persons you represent."'7 4 The Illinois courts enjoined the arrangement as an unauthorized practice of law v5 but the
Supreme Court overruled the Illinois courts. While the Court acknowledged the broad power of the states to regulate the practice of
law, it refused to allow broad rules which impair the rights of individu76
als to assemble peacefully and to petition for a redress of grievances.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of union members to advise each other on legal issues and to help each other secure effective
7
legal representation in United Transportation Union v. State Bar. 1
Here, the union, a successor of the Trainmen's union, helped its members meet the cost of legal representation in personal injury claims by
referring workers injured in Michigan to an Illinois law firm.7 8 The
union also made an initial investigation of the facts of the claim and
turned the results over to the law firm.79
The Supreme Court again extended the First Amendment to the
union practices.80 The Court concluded: "The common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and
United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment."'"
Despite the Supreme Court's strong defense and continued support
of collective activity to gain access to justice, the Court never clearly
defined its contours. Nevertheless, the facts of Button, Trainmen,
United Mine Workers, and United TransportationUnion somewhat define the scope of the First Amendment rights.
The First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organizations,
their members, and staff were at stake in the four cases, not the rights
of the litigants. In Button, the entity with First Amendment interests
was a nonprofit membership corporation82 that had some of the characteristics of a political party.83 The Court held that the NAACP, its
affiliates, and its staff lawyers were protected by the First and Four73. See id. at 218.
74. Id. at 220.
75. See id. at 218-19.
76. See id. at 222-23. The court added that "the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political." Id. at
223.
77. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
78. See id. at 577-78. The firm agreed with the union to limit its fees to 25% of the
recovery. See id.
79. See id. at 579 n.4.
80. See id. at 580.
81. Id. at 585.
82. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963).
83. See id. at 431 (recognizing that the "NAACP is not a conventional political
party" but that it acts in some ways as such).
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teenth Amendments. s4 In Trainmen, the petitioner was a labor union
"founded as a fraternal and mutual benefit society to promote the
welfare of trainmen. '' s The Court extended First and Fourteenth
Amendment protection to the individual members acting through
their union.8 6
Each of the organizations with First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights at stake was seeking to advance its own political and social
objectives by encouraging individuals with redressable injuries to
bring lawsuits and by assisting litigants with their cases. s7
The specific law-related activities engaged in by the NAACP and
the unions included: informing persons about their legal rights,' s advising them to file a lawsuit,39 recommending a particular lawyer, 9°
hiring a lawyer to assist union members, 91 and employing a nonlawyer
to investigate accidents and to gather evidence for trials.' The goals
of the protected activities ranged from asserting freedoms guaranteed
by the Constitution in NAACP v. Button,93 to vindicating rights under
federal protective legislation in Trainmen,94 and to bringing claims
arising under state law in United Mine Workers.95

84. See id. at 428-29.
85. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
86. See id. at 8; see also United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (protecting the right of the union to hire a lawyer "to
assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights").
87. In each of the cases, barriers to obtaining lawyers made it difficult for potential
litigants to vindicate their legal rights. See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 219;
Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 3-4; Button, 371 U.S. at 443. For example, in Trainmen, the
Court observed:
It soon became apparent to the railroad workers, however, that simply having these federal statutes on the books was not enough to assure that the
workers would receive the full benefit of the compensatory damages Congress intended they should have. Injured workers or their families often fell
prey on the one hand to persuasive claims adjusters eager to gain a quick
and cheap settlement for their railroad employers, or on the other to lawyers
either not competent to try these lawsuits against the able and experienced
railroad counsel or too willing to settle a case for a quick dollar.
377 U.S. at 3-4; see also United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 219 (reporting that before
the union hired an attorney on salary, union members were paying 40%-50% of
worker's compensation awards for attorney fees); Button, 371 U.S. at 443 ("Lawsuits
attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, are neither very profitable nor
very popular. They are not an object of general competition among Virginia lawyers;
the problem is rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to undertake such litigation." (footnote omitted)).
88. See Button, 371 U.S. at 434-37.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1971); United
Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 221-22; Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 5.
92. See United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 581-82.
93. 371 U.S. at 430.
94. 377 U.S. at 5-8.
95. 389 U.S. at 224 & n.5.
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Commercial Speech and Law-Related Activities

The rights to engage in commercial speech and association are not
fundamental, even when the speech or association is law-related, but
the First Amendment does afford them protection.96 In FloridaBar v.
Went for It, Inc., the Court upheld a Florida bar rule that prohibited
"personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty days following an accident
or disaster."97 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court used a
three-pronged test for law-related commercial speech: "First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; and
third, the regulation must be narrowly drawn."98
The substantial interest prong of the test requires the state to assert
an interest in support of its rule.9 9 Unlike rational basis review, the
most deferential test, the intermediate standard does not permit the
court itself to put forward conceivable state interests. 100 The second
prong of the test requires the state to demonstrate that the anticipated
harms are real possibilities and that the challenged regulation is likely
to alleviate them. 101
Finally, the third part of the intermediate scrutiny test demands that
the state's regulation be "reasonably well tailored to its stated objective .... 102 The regulation does not have to be the least restrictive

means, but it must be a much closer fit than rational basis review requires.' 3 A regulation prohibiting activities likely to produce the
harms anticipated by the state can satisfy the third prong. 0 n
Florida Bar did not supplant the analysis of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights in Button and the union cases.' 0 5 Instead, it con10 6
cerned commercial speech entitled to a lesser degree of protection.
96. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); see also In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (setting aside the disbarment of a lawyer and holding

that to justify restrictions on commercial speech "the State must assert a substantial
interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest
served"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,

564-66 (1980) (describing the intermediate scrutiny test to be used for commercial
speech).
97. 515 U.S. at 620.
98. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
99. See id. at 624.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 625-26.
102. Id. at 633.
103. See id. at 632.
104. See id. at 632-34.
105. See id. at 634 ("There are circumstances in which we will accord speech by
attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the strongest protection

our Constitution has to offer.").
106. See id. at 634-35.
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The line between the two levels of protection afforded to the different
types of law-related activity was explored in the companion cases of In
re Primus'0 7 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.' s
Edna Smith Primus was a private attorney and an officer of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) affiliate in South Carolina.' 0 9 After speaking to a woman who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving government health insurance, Primus sent the
woman a letter telling her that the ACLU would provide free legal
assistance if she wanted to sue the state.' 10 The ACLU volunteer lawyers designated to take the case shared office space with Primus,"'
and they had agreed to turn over any court awarded attorney fees to
2 The South Carolina bar disciplined Primus for
the organization."
3
solicitation."
The Supreme Court held that Primus's actions were protected by
the First Amendment and the state regulations could not survive strict
scrutiny." 4 Acknowledging that the state had a compelling interest in
preventing undue influence by its lawyers, the Court held that a regulation that impaired fundamental rights must be no broader than the
activity it sought to prevent;" 5 the strict scrutiny standard would not
tolerate a prophylactic regulation." 6 The possibility that the ACLU
might receive attorneys' fees was not sufficient incentive to make its
advocacy of litigation a commercial activity, as the ACLU remained a
not-for-profit organization and did not use the possibility of a fee
award as a consideration in selecting cases." 7
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, decided on the same day as
Primus, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld suspension of the license of a lawyer who followed an accident victim to the
hospital and offered to represent her for a contingency fee in a personal injury suit." 8 The Court found, "In-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component."'1 9 The Court held
that states are permitted to make rules governing commercial activities of lawyers that are "prophylactic measures whose objective is the
107. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
108. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

109. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414.
110. See id at 415-16.
111. See id at 414 n.1, 418 n.8, 428 n.21.

112. See ic at 429-30.
113. See id. at 414.

114. See id. at 432-38.
115. See id at 432-33.

116. See id. at 432.
117. See id at 431 n.25.
118. 436 U.S. 447, 467-68 (1978).

119. Id at 457.
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Rules prohibiting solicitation

of legal business for financial gain, although broader than necessary to
avoid the2 targeted harms, are an acceptable regulation of commercial
activity.'1
Unlike In re Primus, Ohralik involved no cooperative activity between the lawyer and a layperson or organization with primarily polit122
ical interests; it involved merely a private attorney soliciting clients.
This distinction is significant for state rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law when those rules restrict the freedom of speech
and association of organizations with primarily political and social
purposes. Thus, state rules restricting law-related speech and associational activity intended to advance the beliefs of organizations with
primarily political and social purposes are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny, 123 and they must not prohibit more than the
specific acts that
24
the state has a compelling interest in preventing.1

In short, organizations such as the NAACP, the ACLU, and the
United Transportation Union enjoy the strongest First and Fourteenth
Amendment protections when they use the legal system to advance
their political and social objectives."z Freedom from unwarranted
120. Id. at 464. In Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977), the Court held
that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech because the economic incentives to speak can be counted on to overcome the possible chilling effect
of a broad regulation on protected speech.
121. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 461 n.19 ("[W]e cannot say that the pecuniary motivation of the lawyer who solicits a particular representation does not create special
problems of conflict of interest.").
122. Id. at 458.
123. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431-33 (1963).
124. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978).
125. See id. at 438 n.32.
Normally the purpose or motive of the speaker is not central to First
Amendment protection, but it does bear on the distinction between conduct
that is "an associational aspect of 'expression,"' . . . and other activity subject
to plenary regulation by government. Button recognized that certain forms
of "cooperative, organizational activity," . . . including litigation, are part of
the "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas," ... and that this freedom is an implicit guarantee of the First Amendment .... [Primus's] speech-as part of associational activity-was expression intended to advance "beliefs and ideas." In [Orhalik] . . .the lawyer
was not engaged in associational activity for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas; his purpose was the advancement of his own commercial interests.
The line, based in part on the motive of the speaker and the character of the
expressive activity, will not always be easy to draw ... but that is not reason
for avoiding the undertaking.
Id. (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority opinion for establishing a standard based
on the purpose of the speaker, on the grounds that such a subjective standard would
be hard to apply. See id. at 441-42 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). However, the task of
ascertaining the motive of the speaker might be more practical when the speaker is
acting on behalf of an organization with goals that have been agreed to by the members than when the speaker is acting alone. In Button, 371 U.S. at 419-20, the Court
looked to NAACP policy, set by an annual national convention, to ascertain the "ba-
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state interference also extends to the lawyers who cooperate with
these organizations. 26
Nonprofit organizations such as the Domestic Violence Program in
Tennessee and the City-Wide Task Force on Housing Court in New
York present a different model, but one that is analogous to the
NAACP, the unions, and the ALCU. Rather than encouraging prospective litigants to consult a lawyer and sponsoring litigation conducted by lawyers, the two examples represent organizations that
encourage individuals to prosecute or to defend cases in court without
lawyers, when lawyers are not available. They provide nonlawyer
legal assistance to potential and actual litigants who do not have lawyers. The reasoning that led the Court to extend First and Fourteenth
Amendment protection to the activities of the NAACP, the unions,
and the ACLU applies with equal force to the activities engaged in by
the Domestic Violence Program and the City-Wide Task Force on
Housing Court. Organizations that seek to alleviate domestic violence by encouraging victims of battering to vindicate their legal rights
and organizations that seek to keep families secure and safe in their
homes by helping tenants assert their rights in court are similar in motive to the NAACP, the unions, and the ACLU. The primary purpose
of such organizations would be ascertainable from their charters and
official resolutions. State-imposed limits on their activities in support
of litigation that advances their beliefs and ideas should be subject to
strict scrutiny by reviewing courts. Limits on their law-related activities should be based on compelling governmental interests and should
be the least restrictive means likely to achieve the government's
interests.
II.

IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS

Because collective law-related activities for political or social goals
are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, only compelling governmental interests may justify the deprivation of these fundamental rights. 2 7 When evaluating the interests served by the
regulation of the practice of law, courts and the bar have traditionally
focused on protecting the public from harm." Recently, however,
the Supreme Court appears to have shifted that focus to the government's own interest in the operation of the legal system.12 9 That intersic aims and purposes" of the organization. In Brotherhoodof R. Trainmen v. Virginia,377 U.S. 1, 3, n.3 (1964), the Court found the purpose of the organization stated
in the union's constitution. In In re Prinus,436 U.S. at 431, the Court referred to

rules of the Internal Revenue Service that were binding on "public interest law firms"
to determine the purpose of the ACLU.
126. See Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8.
127. See supra notes 48-95 and accompanying text.

128. See ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 1, at 136-40; supra notes
21-25.
129. See FloridaBar v. Went for It, Ina, 515 U.S. 618, 631 n.2.
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est is an important justification for regulation of some law-related
activities. Its recognition, therefore, calls for more careful assessment
of the role of nonlawyer legal assistance in the administration of
justice.
In early cases, states, in their defenses of unauthorized practice
rules, relied on broad statements of governmental interest. 30 These
broad statements included an interest in regulating the legal profession or maintaining high standards
of legal ethics.13 1 The Court has
132
rejected these broad statements.
For example, in Trainmen, the Court observed that the "[s]tate
could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional conduct
of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public
to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest.' 1 33 Similarly, in United Mine Workers, the
Court found that a decree preventing the union from paying a lawyer
to represent injured union members was not needed to "protect the
State's interest in high standards of legal ethics.' 1 34 In Button, the
3
Court required more specific statements of governmental interest. In Button, the Court decided that none of the interests advanced by
the State of Virginia justified a law preventing the NAACP, its lay
members, and its lawyers from soliciting plaintiffs for cases seeking
desegregation of public schools.' 3 6 The Court explained that such

rules were "aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for
private gain, serving no public interest.' 1 37 The Court recognized the
state's narrow interest in preventing conflicts of interest that create a
situation where a lawyer might betray the interests of a client to enrich herself or a lay sponsor.138 In this case, however, the Court found
that these dangers were not implicated in the context
of civil rights
lawyers contesting state-mandated racial segregation.1 39
The Supreme Court has recognized another more specific interest
in protecting the public from harmful communication. The Court ex130. See, e.g., Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6-8 ("[T]he State has failed to advance any
substantial regulatory interest.").
131. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217, 222-24 (1967) (holding that broad rules framed to protect the public cannot justify the substantial impairment of union members' associational rights); Trainmen, 377
U.S. at 7 (stating that a State could not ignore an individual's constitutional rights by
invoking its power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (concluding that "the State has failed to advance any
substantial regulatory interest").
132. See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222-24; Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6-8.
133. 377 U.S. at 7.
134. 389 U.S. at 225.
135. 371 U.S. at 444.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 440.
138. See id. at 442-43.
139. See id. at 442-44.
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plained in In re Primus that a state has a compelling interest in
preventing lawyers from using misleading or overbearing communication, deception, or improper influence to solicit clients or to influence
their decisions.' The Court explained: "The State's special interest
in regulating members of a profession it licenses, and who serve as
officers of its courts, amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn
rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact is misleading, overbearing, or
involves other features of deception or improper influence." '41
More recently, in Florida Bar, the Court recognized two interestsprotecting the public from harm and supporting the administration of
justice-which justify a rule prohibiting lawyers from mailing solicitations directly to accident victims and their relatives within thirty days
of an accident.' 42 The Court recognized a substantial interest in protecting the public from harm-"protecting the privacy and tranquility
of personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers."' 143 The Court also recognized a "paramount" interest in protecting the legal system by preventing actions
that "negatively affec[t] the administration of justice.""' Indeed, the
Court noted that the administration of justice was damaged by "the
erosion of confidence in the profession that such [solicitations] have
engendered."' 45
The interests in protecting the public from harm and protecting the
legal system itself are interconnected. 46 Indeed, the Court noted that
the interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury
victims factored into the state's interest in the administration of justice.' 4 7 "Because direct mail solicitations in the wake of accidents are
perceived by the public as intrusive, .

.

. the reputation of the legal

profession.., has suffered commensurately." 4 ' Similarly, damage to
the administration of justice can ultimately lead to public harm.
The Court distinguished FloridaBar from other First Amendment
cases challenging regulations of the practice of law. 4 9 The Court reasoned that in Florida Bar, the substantial governmental interest advanced was its own interest in carrying out a function of government
rather than merely a paternalistic interest in protecting the public
140. See id.at 438-39.
141. Id. at 438.
142. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995).
143. Id. at 624.
144. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Florida Bar. Petition to Amend the Rules
Regulating the Fla. Bar-Adver. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1990)).
145. Id. at 635.
146. See id.
147. See id.at 624-25.
148. Id. at 625; see Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and

Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 49 Ark L.Rev. 703,724-25
(1997) (questioning the Court's reliance on polling data to establish a governmental
interest in action that curbs First Amendment rights).
149. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 628-31.
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from harm.15 ° Perhaps this indicates that the Court has shifted the
focus away from the governmental interest in protecting the public-

which includes protecting the public from shoddy work, invasion of
privacy, undue influence, deception, fraud, and overreaching to the
governmental interest in the operationof the legal system-which has
included measures the courts have cited to preserve confidence in the

legal profession, protect the attorney-client relationship, license and
supervise lawyers in their role as officers of the courts, assure the economic viability of the bar, and15maintain
the moral and ethical fabric of
1
the administration of justice.

150. See id. at 631 n.2 ("There is an obvious difference between situations in which
the government acts in its own interests, or on behalf of entities it regulates, and
situations in which the government is motivated primarily by paternalism.").
151. The dual interests expressed in FloridaBar of protecting the public from harm
and supporting the administration of justice recur consistently in cases testing the
limits of state regulation of law-related activities. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466, 474-75 (1988) (dealing with direct solicitations' potential for unduly influencing a lay person); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) (finding the possibility of "overreaching, invasion of
privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud"); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978) (noting that "the potential for overreaching is
significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person"); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) ("Without denying the power of the State to take measures
to correct... substantive evils.., this Court has required that 'broad rules framed to
protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice' must not
work a significant impairment of 'the value of associational freedoms."' (quoting
United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)));
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) ("Restraints on advertising ... are an
ineffective way of deterring shoddy work."). The Supreme Court has recognized
that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions
within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public
health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of the professions. . . . The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially
great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been "officers of the courts."
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 772, 792 (1975) (citations omitted). The governmental interest in the administration of justice encompasses measures to preserve
confidence in the legal profession. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 635 ("The Bar has
substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by
lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered."); see also United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222
("But it is equally apparent that broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice can in their actual operation significantly impair the value of associational freedoms."). The government might also take
measures to protect the attorney-client relationship, see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454
("The solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication
with the prospective client has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's
ideal of the attorney-client relationship."), to license and supervise lawyers in their
role as officers of the courts, see In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438, to assure the economic
viability of the bar, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 377-78, and to maintain the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) ("Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a
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According to Professor Rhode, while the feared harms to the public
are serious concerns of state government, they are insufficient justifications for a comprehensive state regulation of law-related activities.15 2 Even when reviewed under the relaxed standard of scrutiny
applied to commercial speech, rules imposing qualifications for the
practice of law, restricting solicitation of legal business, and controlling the relationship between litigants and their representatives seem
to be overreactions to the perceived evils.15 3 Moreover, Professor
Rhode questions whether unauthorized practice of law rules effectively protect the public against incompetent representation. She
writes that
[t]he traditional rationale for unauthorized practice constraintsprotection of the public from incompetent and unethical servicescannot support the scope of current prohibitions. Although the risk
to consumers should not be overlooked, it has been too often overstated. As noted earlier, in many contexts where lay services are
prevalent, certification as a lawyer is neither a necessary nor a sufficient guarantee of competence. Attorneys who lack experience in a
certain subject area may be less able to provide1 cost-effective routine services than experienced legal technicians. 5
The fear of harm to the public, however, is not the sole justification
for unauthorized practice of law rules. The government's interest in
the administration of justice and its ultimate connection to the prevention of public harm, as noted in FloridaBar, helps to explain the legitimate need for regulation of some law-related activities.
Consequently, Professor Rhode's framework is incomplete without a
consideration of this important interest. The next part examines this
interest in the administration of justice, focusing on the limited exercise of judicial power and the role of judicial accessibility within that
interest.

III. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN THE OPERATION OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM

Traditionally, courts have given insufficient attention to the government's interest in maintaining an orderly system of justice at both the
state and federal levels. Yet, as noted above, it is an important justification for rules governing the practice of law.
The most imperative requirements of the operation of the judiciary
are derived from the Constitution and the historical understanding of
commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and ethical
fabric of the administration of justice.").
152. See Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 26, at 707-09.

153. See idL
at 710-11 (arguing that the public can be protected from incompetence
more efficiently by licensing systems for nonlawyers).
154. Rhode, Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, supra note 26, at 230.

2260

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

the role of adjudication in our system of government. 155 Courts exercise judicial power by making judgments and issuing orders in cases
before them. They also exercise judicial power by making law
through the precedential effect of their decisions.15 6 The doctrine of
stare decisis in both federal and state courts ensures that these decisions will not only determine the conduct of the parties to a particular
case, but 5will
also influence the conduct of others in similar
7
situations.1
Although the Constitution and the traditional role of our judiciary
limit the exercise of judicial power to cases and controversies, they
also require that the judiciary be accessible to individuals with
claims.' 58 Within this system, lawyers are a necessary ingredient.' 5 9
Indeed, courts could not function within the limits of the Constitution
and make justice accessible to all without relying on lawyers for some
tasks.160 This part examines the operation of the legal system, specifically focusing on the limits of judicial power and the requirements of
making justice available to all. Part III.A first examines limits on judicial power. Part III.B examines the requirements of making justice
available to all. Both sections note the role of lawyers in this scheme.
A.

Limiting the Exercise of JudicialPower

At all levels of government, access to the courts is limited. In both
federal and state courts the judicial power is reserved for litigants who
have a personal stake in a matter that can be brought before the court.
Article III of the Constitution restricts the judicial power of federal
courts to "cases" and "controversies."'' The case or controversy language creates two different kinds of limitations. First, it assures that
the judicial branch does not act as a legislative body, but exercises
power only in the context of adjudication. 162 Further, the language
also assures that individuals who invoke the power of the judiciary are
155. See Peters, Adjudication as Representation,supra note 29, at 435-36.

156. Id. at 347 (explaining that "[s/taredecisis binds only to the extent that parties
to subsequent cases are situated similarly to the parties in precedential cases").
157. Id. at 361 (explaining that a rule made by a court in one case "islikely to
persist not merely as a rule of decision-to be followed by courts in deciding subsequent cases-but as a rule of conduct as well, to be followed by individuals and entities rationally conducting their everyday affairs"); see also Llewellyn, supra note 29, at
72-75 (contrasting "orthodox" and "loose" views of precedent's function in courts).
158. See infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
159. The Sixth Amendment, for example, recognizes the critical role of lawyers in
the administration of justice by guaranteeing the right to counsel in criminal cases. See
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
160. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967) (discussing the role of lawyers in
juvenile court delinquency proceedings). The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to appoint a lawyer for a child and his parents who are unable to afford counsel, if the proceeding may result in the commitment
of the child to an institution. Id. at 41.
161. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
162. See id. at 94-95.
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proper parties to participate in an adversarial proceeding under the
doctrine of standing. 163 As the court explained in Flast v. Cohen,
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words
limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power
to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." 6
In state courts, too, the common law doctrine of standing serves the
purpose of assuring that courts adjudicate actual cases and controversies between litigants with adverse interests. 6 ' Although the power
of state courts varies from state to state, all courts must set some
boundary at which judicial power ends and legislative and executive
powers begin. The doctrine of standing sets the boundaries for individual access to the courts by determining
who is a proper party to
66
invoke the power of the court.
Once the litigants meet the case and controversy requirements, they
have access to remarkable powers within the legal system. Those
6
powers include the ability to initiate cases, 167 to conduct discovery,' 8
69
7
to frame issues for courts to decide,' to obtain decisions, ' and to
enlist public officials in enforcing judgments and orders."" Clearly,
the lawyer, as an agent for her client, exercises substantial power in
these law-related activities. The possibility that a representative who
is permitted to invoke judicial power on behalf of a qualified litigant
might misuse this remarkable power to advance personal interests,
whether financial or ideological, in ways that conflict with the interests
of the actual litigant poses a significant risk to the integrity of the legal
system. Ethical rules that prohibit conflicts of interest between law163. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L
Rev. 1513, 1549 (1991).
164. Flast,392 U.S. at 94-95.
165. See Peters, supra note 29, at 428 (arguing that adjudication should be limited
to those cases where the plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome so that
the court can base its substantive decision on facts particular enough to allow later
litigants to distinguish them); see also Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 72-73 (explaining
that under an orthodox view of precedent, the power of a court to make law by establishing precedent is limited by the actual facts and procedural issues before the court).
166. See Brown, supra note 163, at 1549.
167. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (providing that a civil action is commenced upon the
filing of a complaint with the court).
168. See, eg., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (listing rules and procedures governing
discovery).
169. See Peters, supra note 29, at 348, 353, 369-70.
170. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L Rev.
353, 387-391 (1978); Peters, supra note 29, at 348-49.
171. See, eg., Fed. R. Civ. P. 64, 69-70 (specifying procedures for enforcing
judgments).
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yers and their clients and rules that proscribe misleading and overbearing solicitation serve to enforce the standing requirements of
courts and to prevent misuse of judicial power 1by
individuals who
2
have no standing to initiate litigation themselves.
B.

Making Justice Accessible

Although constitutional and judicial doctrines limit access to courts,
at the same time, they seek to ensure access for litigants who meet the
requirements.1 73 Nonlawyer assistance often is crucial in facilitating
this access.' 74 Moreover, in recent decades, the expansion of these
doctrines increased the necessity of nonlawyer assistance.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded the federal
court doctrine of standing to include many individuals who never
before had access to the courts for redress of their grievances. 75 The
new inclusiveness of the standing doctrine fueled the increased need
for legal services for poor persons. 176 This expansion of the standing
doctrine paralleled the expansion of the protections of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.177 Indeed, as
the Supreme Court extended due process protection to the benefi1 78
ciaries of protective legislation in cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly
and Mathews v. Eldridge,7l 9 it also made the doctrine of standing
more inclusive, so that beneficiaries of protective legislation could invoke the power of federal courts when threatened with the loss or
deprivation of entitlements. 8 0° In Association of Data ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp, the Supreme Court extended the
172. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Justice Harlan wrote in dissent:
The State has sought to prohibit the solicitation and sponsoring of litigation
by those who have no standing to initiate that litigation themselves and who
are not simply coming to the assistance of indigent litigants. Thus the state
policy is not unrelated to the federal rules of standing-the insistence that
federal court litigants be confined to those who can demonstrate a pressing
personal need for relief.
Id. at 463-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In In re Primus, the Court, acknowledging the concern expressed by Justice Harlan
in Button, explained:
Nor does the record permit a finding of a serious likelihood of conflict of
interest or injurious lay interference with the attorney-client relationship.
Admittedly, there is some potential for such conflict or interference whenever a lay organization supports any litigation.
436 U.S. 412, 436 (1978).
173. See Brown supra note 150, at 1549-53.
174. See Button, 371 U.S. at 435-36, 41-42.
175. See id. at 1551-52.
176. See Alan W. Houseman, A Short Review of Past Poverty Law Advocacy, 23
Clearinghouse Rev. 1514, 1515-17 (1990).
177. See Brown, supra note 163, at 1549-53.
178. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
179. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
180. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970).
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doctrine of standing to include individuals whose claims were arguably
within the "zone of interest" of a statute or regulation.' , ' By expanding access to federal courts, the Court not only enabled beneficiaries of protective legislation to seek judicial review of the fairness
of procedures in government programs, but also ensured that the legislation would be interpreted by a branch of government not charged
with its administration.'"
The 1960s and 1970s also saw increased legal advocacy on behalf of
poor persons. 18 3 The victories in cases brought by minorities and disadvantaged persons opened the courts as a source of relief for injustices and, at the same time, created a greater need for lawyers to
enforce legislation and constitutional rights.'8 The success of the
NAACP litigation strategy that culminated in Brown v. Board of Editcation 8 5 led to lawsuits by racial
minorities challenging racial segrega86
tion throughout the country.
President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty embraced legal advocacy as part of its strategy to combat poverty."s It laid the groundwork for the federal Legal Services Corporation that established law
offices to provide free legal assistance for poor persons throughout the
country.18

Congress, however, has since retreated from its commitment to provide lawyers to represent poor persons vith legal interests requiring
the protection of the courts.' 9 Funding for the national Legal Services Corporation was cut from a high of $321 million in 1981 to $241
million in 1982 and has never regained the 1981 level of funding.' °
181. Id.
182. See Brown, supra note 163, at 1549-53.
183. See Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar

Ass'n, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum,
Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 5054 (1992) [hereinafter The MacCrate Report] (describing the expansion of legal services for the poor during the 1960s and 1970s).
184. See id- at 50; Houseman, supra note 176, at 1516-17.
185. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
186. See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (1975) (describing the NAACP litigation strategy in the fight against racial segregation); see also NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 435 n.16 (1963) (citing numerous cases challenging public school segregation
in Virginia alone).
187. See The MacCrate Report, supra note 183, at 49-51.

188. See id. at 50-54; igran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty
of Public Service: More Than Charity?,96 W. Va. L. Rev. 367, 370-73 (1993-94); Alan
W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary, 83
Geo. L.J. 1669, 1672-85 (1995).
189. N. Lee Cooper & Stephen F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image
and the Scope of Professionalism, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 923, 939 (1996).
190. See Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 188, at 370-71. Congress appropriated
$300 million for the Legal Services Corporation for the 1999 fiscal year. Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L No.
105-277, § 411, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
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This retreat risks harm to both the public and the legal system.
Legal interests entitled to judicial protection from unlawful deprivation include rights to housing, health care, education, nutrition, and
income maintenance for persons with disabilities and the unemployed.' 91 If the legislative and executive branches of government do
not provide adequate support for programs that make meaningful access to the courts possible, the rights and legal interests of many will
go unrecognized and unfulfilled. In turn, the proper operation of the
legal system requires the vindication of the rights and legal interests of
those with standing. Therefore, the operation of the legal system
might falter if it will be unable to uphold the rights and legal interests
of individuals who meet the standing requirements. Consequently,
the judiciary should find ways to allow those who are unrepresented
to gain meaningful access to the courts. In many areas, this must include the availability of nonlawyer assistance.
When courts scrutinize laws that prohibit nonlawyer legal assistance, they must consider whether licensed lawyers are actually available to persons with legal claims.' 92 Laws that restrict commercial
enterprises that help with law-related matters must likewise be balanced by realistic efforts to make legal assistance available when and
where it is needed.
The regulation of lawyers, of course, is necessary, as is regulation of
the use of judicial power by nonlawyers. Nevertheless, those regulations must not be used to reverse the role of the federal and state
courts as protectors of the rights of all persons. Where regulation is
needed, the means used to achieve the government's interests must be
carefully chosen so as not to infringe on the role of the courts as protector of the rights and liberty of every person.
IV.

ASSESSING THE NEED FOR REGULATION

Rules prohibiting unauthorized practice of law have a particularly
adverse impact on the First Amendment rights of organizations with
primarily political and social goals. Rules curtailing First Amendment
rights of organizations with primarily political and social goals must be
the least restrictive means necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.193 Such rules must identify the prohibited activity
with precision, 194 and must not be so broad as to include protected
191. See Houseman, supra note 176, at 1517-18.
192. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (holding that prison writ
writers have the right to assist prisoners in drafting petitions for writs of habeas
corpus because, without nonlawyer assistance, "their possibly valid constitutional
claims will never be heard in any court" (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783,
784 (M.D. Tenn. 1966))).
193. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).
194. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-49 (1991) (holding that an ethical
rule that fails to give fair notice of the contours of prohibited conduct, absent a clarifying interpretation by a state court, is void for vagueness).
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speech within an otherwise valid prohibition. ' In addition, they
must not prohibit protected speech and
association simply because
19 6
they have the potential to cause harm.
The ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice detailed risks of
harm to the public posed by some types of nonlawyer legal assistance. 1 9 7 The commission urged courts to examine specific nonlawyer
activities and to adopt levels of regulation, ranging from prohibition to
no regulation at all, when examining nonlawyer activities."" Professor Rhode has also concluded that the laws prohibiting unauthorized
practice of law do a poor job of protecting the public from harm
caused by ineffective legal assistance. 199
Many critics of state laws and ethical rules prohibiting unauthorized
practice of law have focused solely on whether the regulations are
well-tailored to the government's goal of preventing potential harms
to the public.2°° As stated above, a complete picture also requires an
examination of how well-tailored such regulations are to the government's own interests in the operation of the legal system. 201 Therefore, this part does not make a new examination of the risks of harm
and the benefits to the public of nonlawyer legal activities. Instead, it
reviews only the risks and benefits to the operation of the legal system
posed by nonlawyer legal activities.
This part analyzes the threats and benefits to the operation of the
legal system of nonlawyer legal activities and the rules prohibiting
them. It suggests the need for levels of regulation of specific nonlawyer activities that might not be justified, alone, by the governmental
interest in protecting the public from harm.
The activities of nonprofit organizations such as the Domestic Violence Program and the City-Wide Task Force on Housing Court challenge the courts and the bar to determine whether restrictions on
specific law-related activities can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny
that is applied to state action that restricts fundamental rights. Courts
and the bar should ask what is the compelling governmental interest
that justifies the restriction and has the state agency chosen the least
restrictive means of achieving it. The three questions posed by Profes195. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,

432-33 (1963).
196. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 434-36 (holding that prophylactic restraints on noncommercial speech and association violate the First Amendment).

197. See ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 1, at 126-30.
198. See id. at 136-57.
199. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective,supra note 26, at 710-11.

200. See ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 1, at 126-30, 136-42;
Andrews, supra note 37, at 621; Rhode, The Deliver), of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, supra note 26, at 230; Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly, supra note 26,
at 90-94. Professor David B. Wilkins evaluates the impact of competing approaches
to regulating the practice of law on the professional independence of lawyers as well
as on the protection of the public. Wilkins, supra note 34, at 804-19.
201. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 631 n.2 (1995).
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sor Rhode provide a useful framework for examining whether regulations are likely to meet the test of strict scrutiny. However, limiting
the analysis to the government's interest in protecting the public from
harm does not go far enough. This section applies the three questions
to the government's interest in the operation of the legal system.
The first question asks what are the risks and benefits to the operation of the legal system in allowing various types of nonlawyer legal
assistance.20 2 The second question asks whether there are ways to
minimize the risks without prohibiting specific nonlawyer activitiesin other words, it asks whether there is a less restrictive approach than
prohibiting nonlawyer activity. 20 3 The final question asks who
should
2°
decide whether regulation is needed and how to provide it. '
A.

Risks and Benefits of Nonlawyer Legal Assistance

This section answers Professor Rhode's first question in the context
on nonlawyer legal activities. It first identifies the law-related activities which are subject to regulation. It then examines the risks of nonlawyer legal assistance. Finally, it examines its benefits. The
examination in this section of risks and benefits of nonlawyer legal
assistance to the operation of the legal system is followed in the next
section by discussion of ways of minimizing the risks that are less restrictive than prohibiting nonlawyer activities outright.
1. Identifying Law-related Activity Subject to Regulation
Under First Amendment jurisprudence, state rules that regulate or
prohibit nonlawyer law-related activities must specify the activity subject to regulation with sufficient precision. 0 5 The term, "practice of
law," is too broad to provide a meaningful description of the activity
forbidden to nonlawyers20 6 Nevertheless, the "practice of law" can
be divided into distinct groups of law-related activity.
Courts have defined the practice of law to include representing parties in contested cases, 20 7 negotiating the settlement of claims,20 drafting documents,2 0 9 giving legal advice, 210 and representing oneself to
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978).
206. See Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 26, at 710-11.
207. See, e.g., Nicollet Restoration, Inc., v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753, 754-55
(Minn. 1992) (holding that it is unauthorized practice of law for a nonlawyer to appear for a corporation in a court proceeding).
208. See, e.g., Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 234 (Pa.
1976) (holding that negotiating settlements on behalf of injured claimants for a contingency fee constitutes unauthorized practice of law).
209. See, e.g., Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 586 P.2d 870, 875 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (concluding "that the selection and
completion of form legal documents, or the drafting of such documents, including

1999]

NONLAWYER LEGAL ASSISTANCE

2267

be licensed to practice law.2 ' In other contexts, nonlawyers routinely
engage in similar activities such as drafting documents, entering negotiations, and giving professional advice.212 While nonlawyers face little regulation or prohibition regarding these activities in other fields,
they face much regulation of law-related activity in a legal context due
to the perceived risks.
2. Risks
In a legal context, giving legal advice, drafting legal documents, and
negotiating the settlement of claims in situations not related to a case
pending in court pose little threat to the operation of the legal system. 213 Advice about the law given by a nonlawyer to an individual
who is not a party to a legal proceeding does not threaten misuse of
judicial power. An individual who is not a party to a case does not
have access to the power of the judiciary and therefore cannot misuse
it. Contracts and deeds, whether drafted by a nonlawyer or a lawyer,
do not create access to judicial power that might be subject to abuse.
Negotiating the settlement of a claim that has not been filed in a court
does not implicate the judiciary in the fairness of the result. Provided
that the person giving assistance does not fraudulently claim to be licensed or regulated by a court, the rendition of bad advice, poor drafting, or ineffective negotiation should not result in misuse of judicial
power nor damage to the reputation of the judiciary.
In pending cases, however, when pro se litigants receive such nonlawyer legal advice, there is some threat to the orderly operation of
the legal system-the pro se litigant might fail to take action, to reveal
facts, or to make arguments due to ineffective assistance by an individual without sufficient training. A pattern of court decision making
based on inadequately developed facts and uninformed legal arguments could undermine the integrity of the legal system. If the nonlawyer falsely leads the litigant to believe that the court has
deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes and agreements modifying these
documents constitutes the practice of law").
210. See, eg., In re Jorissen, 391 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. 1986) (per curiam) (hold-

ing that a suspended lawyer violates the rule against unauthorized practice of law
when "the non-lawyer acts in a representative capacity in protecting, enforcing, or
defending the legal rights of another, and advises and counsels that person in connection with those rights").
211. See, e.g., Kansas v. Schumacher, 519 P.2d 1116, 1127-28 (Kan. 1974) (per

curiam) (holding that a suspended attorney who holds himself out to the public as
capable of practicing law is in contempt of a court order suspending him from the
practice of law).

212. See, e.g., The MacCrate Report, supra note 183, at 135-99 (describing skills
required in the practice of law).

213. The possibility of injury to an individual by a nonlawyer's bad advice, poor
drafting, or ineffective negotiation might justify regulation because of the potential
for harm to the public, but not because they pose a significant threat to the operation
of the legal system.
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authorized or supervised the activity, the pro se litigant might wrongly
attribute an unjust decision to the bias of the court.
Despite these risks, the threat to the legal system posed by inadequate nonlawyer legal advice, drafting assistance, or representation in
negotiations seems minor when weighed against the risk posed to the
legal system by denying unrepresented litigants meaningful participation in court proceedings. In light of this, less drastic means of protecting the governmental interest in the operation of the legal system
than prohibiting the nonlawyer activities are possible. These possibilities will be explored in the next section.
Nevertheless, the governmental interest in the operation of the
legal system may require some level of regulation of activities involved in representing litigants in contested cases.214 Because litigants
have significant power, and their representatives often exercise those
powers for them,215 unregulated representation of litigants in contested cases risks misuse of judicial power. Depending on the type of
hearing or trial, the representative might have the power to conduct
217
discovery, 216 to compel testimony and the production of documents,
to object to testimony, 218 to waive rights of a party,2t 9 to frame issues
for courts to decide, 220 and to obtain decisions that have binding effect
on future cases.22 '
Representatives not subject to appropriate regulation could undermine the legitimacy of the legal system by using the power for purposes that conflict with the interests of the actual litigant. For
instance, misuse of the discovery powers by a representative whose
interests conflict with those of litigant might result in invading the privacy of others for reasons not justified by the strategy of the case.
The judiciary's interest in limiting its power to resolve disputes and
to make law to the cases of litigants with standing to invoke judicial
power is threatened by the delegation of a court's power to representatives not subject to appropriate regulation. The representative
whose interests conflict with those of the litigant might frame issues
for the court unrelated to the interests of the litigant, so that the re214. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (depositions and discovery rules).
217. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1651-52 (1997) (holding that a litigant can compel even the President of the United States to give testimony in a civil
case).
218. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring a timely objection to evidence as a
condition of claiming error on appeal).
219. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (holding that a
federal court has the inherent power to dismiss a litigant's case on the court's own
motion if the litigant's lawyer fails to prosecute the case).
220. See Peters, supra note 26, at 348; see also Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their
Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 487-881
(1994) (advocating a stronger client role in framing the theory of a case).
221. See Fuller, supra note 170, at 387-91; Peters, supra note 29, at 348-49.
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suiting decision and legal precedent would not be grounded in a true
adversary proceeding. Furthermore, ineffective representation by untrained representatives would undermine the courts' reliance on advocates to develop relevant facts and to present cases in an adversarial
context.777
Once again, the threat to the operation of the legal system resulting
from nonlawyer activities must be weighed against the threat posed by
judicial proceedings in which parties appear but do not have meaningful access to justice due to lack of assistance. The means of protecting
the legal system short of total prohibition of nonlawyer activities will
be reviewed in the next section.
3.

Benefits

In some circumstances, however, the operation of the legal system
would benefit from the availability of nonlawyer representation in
contested cases. In courts with a high proportion of pro se litigants,
such as the New York City Housing Court, nonlawyers can contribute
to the goal of providing meaningful access to the courts by offering 2to
litigants basic information about the law and court procedures. 23
Nonlawyers can also contribute to the orderly operation of the courts
by assisting pro se litigants with the preparation of relevant testimony
and evidence in court proceedings that occur on short notice, such as
hearings on petitions for orders of protection.2 4
B.

Ways of Minimizing Risks to the Operation of the Legal System

This section corresponds to Rhode's second consideration. It examines whether certain risks to the operation of the legal system may be
minimized without prohibiting specific nonlawyer activities. This section first examines the most prevalent regulation that prevents the
misuse of judicial power and resources-rules that allow only lawyers
to represent litigants in contested cases. It then identifies some methods of regulating law-related activities that may be less restrictive, not222. See Peters, supra note 29, at 348.
Judges may finish cases, but they do not initiate them or move them toward
conclusion; they do not decide what facts need to be proven; they do not
determine what legal arguments will be presented. Judges rule on motions,
but they do not bring them; they respond to objections during testimony, but
only rarely do they elicit testimony themselves; they hear arguments of
counsel and read legal briefs, but they do not make or write them. All of
this-all of the activity that drives adjudication forward, that defines the
legal issues and determines what facts will animate them-is done by the
litigants themselves, through their counsel.
Id- (footnote omitted).
223. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. For a discussion of nonlawyer legal
assistance in domestic violence cases, see ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice,
supra note 1, at 155-57.
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ing that the First Amendment requires the states to pursue possible
less restrictive avenues to achieve their goal.2 25

There are strong arguments for allowing only licensed lawyers to
represent litigants in contested cases. The adversary system places
considerable reliance on litigants and their representatives to develop
the facts of their cases, to research the law, and to frame issues for

courts to decide.226 The legal training of lawyers prepares them for
these tasks.2 27 Thus, the ethical rules imposed by courts on lawyers
protect the courts as well as the public.
The ethical requirements of confidentiality, 2 8 candor,2 2 9 competence, 230 and loyalty231 provide important protections for parties and

for courts. The requirement of confidentiality permits clients to reveal
secret interests and unfavorable facts to their lawyers without fear of
exposure. 2332 The requirement of candor toward a client insures that a
lawyer will honestly inform
a client about existing law and the implications of a client's actions.2 33 The duty of candor towards a tribunal
225. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978).
226. See Peters, supra note 26, at 348.
227. See Roy T. Stuckey, Education for the Practiceof Law: The Times They Are
A-Changin', 75 Neb. L. Rev. 648, 659-660 (1996) (describing how legal education
prepares lawyers for practice).
228. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6, 3.3 (1998) (regarding
confidentiality and candor toward the tribunal); see also id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 ("The
observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal
assistance.").
229. See, e.g., id. Rule 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."); id. Rule
3.3 (regarding the duty of candor toward a tribunal).
230. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
231. See, e.g., id. Rules 1.7-1.13 (regarding conflicts of interest); id. Rule 1.7 cmt. 1
("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
232. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (describing how the obligation of confidentiality
encourages open and honest communication); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 118 S. Ct. 2081,2086 (1998) ("Knowing that communications will remain confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with
counsel.").
233. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 cmt. 1 (discussing client's entitlement to straight forward advice). For a discussion of the duty of lawyers
to use independent judgment in counseling clients, see generally Donald C.
Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-SecuritiesLawyering" Beliefs, Biases and
OrganizationalBehavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629, 676 (1997) (arguing that the independence in corporate-securities lawyering is crucial in overcoming "cognitive and organizational pressures that bias managerial perception and decision-making"); David
Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 31, 31 (1995) (discussing good judgment as the most important issue in
teaching professional responsibility at a time when the legal profession seems to be
experiencing a "crisis of professionalism"); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives
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protects the operation of the legal system from dishonesty and allows
courts to rely upon the statements of lawyers.

'

The ethical obliga-

tion of loyalty to a client addresses the risk that representatives will
use the power of the courts to advance personal interests at the ex-

pense of the interests of the individuals with standing to invoke judicial power.235

The requirement of competence not only protects the public but
conserves the resources of courts by allowing courts to rely on the

development of cases in an adversarial context. 6 In recent years, the
organized bar and legal educators have engaged in extensive debate
about the skills and values necessary to provide competent representation.7
The debate has had a substantial impact on legal
education. 238
on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 594 (1985) (advocating that professional responsibility should emphasize individual morality rather than conformity to a code of
conduct); Amy D. Ronner, Some In-House Appellate Litigation Clinic's Lessons in
ProfessionalResponsibility: Musical Stories of Candorand the Sandbag, 45 Am. U. L
Rev. 859, 867 (1996) (arguing that students can explore their own judgments through
an appellate advocacy clinic); William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1083-84, 1090-91 (1988) (rejecting a categorical approach to legal
ethics which utilizes formalized rules, and instead advocating reliance on lawyers'
good judgment and discretion); Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activisn, 8 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 9, 9-12 (1995) (describing the intersection of philosophy and lawyering in discussions of legal ethics).
234. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (1998).
235. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.7 (representing clients wvith adverse interests); id. Rule 1.8
(addressing prohibited transactions between lawyers and clients); id. Rule 1.9 (discussing conflicts of interest with former clients); id. Rule 1.10 (addressing conflicts of
interest imputed to all members of a firm); id. Rule 1.11 (representing a private client
on a matter formerly handled by the lawyer as a government official); id. Rule 1.12
(representing a client on a matter in which the lawyer has participated as a judge); id.
Rule 1.13 (discussing the lawyer's duty of loyalty to an organization as client when
members of the organization have conflicting interests).
236. See, e.g., id Rule 1.1 (describing competent representation).
237. See generally The MacCrate Report, supra note 183, at 83-88, 123-33 (defining
the skills and values that are desirable for practicing attorneys); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612
passim (1984) (arguing that legal education should largely include clinical experiences
rather than traditional instruction); Gary L. Blasi, WIat Lawyers Know: Lawyering
Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. Legal Educ. 313, 317
(1995) (advocating a broader view and method for achieving expertise as a lawyer);
Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 109, 178 (1993-94) (analyzing a particular method of
clinical supervision that "constantly identiqies] those aspects of the law, lawyering,
and the legal system that are critical to an understanding of what it means to be a
lawyer"); Stuckey, supra note 227, at 669-71 (calling for law schools to educate their
students to be problem solvers). For an overview of skills and values required for the
practice of law as identified by leaders in clinical legal education, see generally
Clinical Anthology: Readings for Live-Client Clinics (Alex J. Hurder et al. eds.,
1997) (presenting recent scholarship to aid in classroom teaching and discussion in
live client clinics).
238. See Stuckey, supra note 227, at 655-69.
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Some law-related activities, no doubt, require regulation. Those areas that directly implicate judicial power warrant regulation because
the potential abuses and distortion of the judicial power could greatly
disrupt the operation of the legal system. Without a means of limiting
access to judicial power to individuals with standing to litigate, the
legal system would become an instrument of arbitrary power rather
than a source of justice. 2 9 Certain law-related activities, such as framing issues for courts to decide, give direction to the law-making power
of the courts.2 4 ° Other activities, such as compelling witnesses to appear for questioning at depositions and trials, make direct use of the
judicial power.2 41 Courts must exercise appropriate control over representatives who exercise the powers that are available to litigants in
court cases. Individuals with grievances have the power to initiate
cases. 242 Individuals with standing have direct access to the power to
conduct discovery, to frame issues for courts to decide, to compel the
attendance of witnesses at hearings and trials, to compel witnesses to
reveal secrets and to produce documents, and to enlist public officials
to enforce court orders.2 43

Because individuals with standing must be allowed to enlist representatives to litigate their cases in order to make access to the courts
meaningful, 2' courts must have a means to ensure that representatives who assist litigants use the powers at their disposal to advance
the interests of the litigant rather than the representative's conflicting
personal interests. Courts must also have a means to insure that representatives, who through petitions, motions, briefs, and arguments
frame issues for courts to decide, have sufficient training to recognize
relevant facts, to identify existing law, and to make arguments to apply or change law.
Although there are strong arguments for allowing only licensed lawyers to represent litigants in contested cases, the First Amendment
requires that states seek the least restrictive means of regulating political speech and association.245 Some courts have contemplated less
239. See Peters, supra note 29, at 360-61 (arguing that legitimacy of the legal system
is based on the adequate representation of the interests affected).
240. See id. at 347-48.
241. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (listing rules governing discovery and depositions); Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (holding that even the President of the
United States is not temporarily immune from suit).
242. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-430 (1963) (explaining that
litigation is a means for the "redress of grievances," an activity protected by the First
Amendment).
243. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
244. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) (explaining
that collective activity undertaken to obtain access to the courts is protected by the
First Amendment).
245. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1978).
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restrictive measures. Indeed, some courts have chosen to permit nonlawyer assistance to litigants in specific types of activities.
For instance, in In re Buck, a bankruptcy court held that a written
request by a nonlawyer representative for service of notices filed in a
bankruptcy case was not an unauthorized practice of law.24 ' The court
explained, the "district's local bankruptcy rules should not be interpreted to place an unnecessary and expensive burden on non-local
attorneys or creditors,2' who
are wanting to receive copies of pleadings
47
that may affect them.
When the Texas State Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
claimed that nonlawyer legal assistance in bankruptcy proceedings violated the local bankruptcy court's rule against the unauthorized practice of law, the Fifth Circuit denied the claim. 2 48 The activities
performed by nonlawyer representatives included filing proofs of
claim in bankruptcy proceedings, monitoring the status of cases, and
negotiating reaffirmation agreements with debtors' counsel.2 4 9 The
court found, "The average amount of each claim is small and effectively precludes economically efficient management by the creditor or
an attorney."" 0 The court reasoned that prohibiting the nonlawyer
activities "conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code's purpose to secure just,
speedy, and inexpensive determinations without requiring the adjudication of undisputed matters."" 1
Many federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services,"5 2 the Immigration and Naturalization Service 2 3 the U.S. Department of Labor,- 4 and the Social Security Administration, 25 5 permit nonlawyers to appear in cases before them.
Patent agents assume the rights and obligations of lawyers in patent
hearings.21 6 A 1992 survey by the New York County Lawyer's Association Committee on Legal Assistance showed that a majority of New
York City and New York State agencies permit nonlawyer advocacy in
some form.2 57
246. In re Buck, 219 B.R. 996 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1998).
247. Id at 1000-01.
248. See State Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Paul Mason & Assoc., Inc.,
46 F.3d 469, 470-72 (5th Cir. 1995).
249. See id at 470.
250. Id
251. Id. at 471; see also In re Kincaid, 146 B.R. 387, 390-91 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1992) (holding that questioning a debtor at a meeting of creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding is not unauthorized practice of law).

252. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (a)(3)(iii) (1997).
253.
254.
255.
256.

See 8 C.F.R. § 292.1 (1997).
See 29 C.F.R. § 18.34 (1997).
See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (1994).
See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1963) (holding that

the federal statute that permits nonlawyer patent agents to represent parties before
the U.S. Patent Office preempts state rules prohibiting unauthorized practice of law.)

257. New York State Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Utilization by Lawyers of the
Services of Legal Assistants 42 (1997).
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Nevertheless, the broad sweep of unauthorized practice of law
rules, supported by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
discourage innovative approaches-such as these-which address the
need for greater access to the legal system. 8 The ban on assisting the
unauthorized practice of law in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, to the extent that such a ban is adopted by the states, may
threaten the First Amendment rights of lawyers and the public as
well. 25 9 Indeed, a broad ban that is enforceable by punitive sanctions
could have a chilling effect on activity that is constitutionally protected but may arguably fall within the scope of the rule. As the court
explained in NAACP v. Button, "It makes no difference whether such
prosecutions or proceedings would actually be commenced. It is
enough that a vague and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes."26
Lawyers are not likely to participate in activities that rely on nonlawyer legal assistance to expand access to courts if their participation
puts them in jeopardy of disbarment proceedings. Therefore, the governmental interests in the operation of the legal system are not served
by overbroad restrictions on First Amendment liberties. Moreover,
this increases the need to find ways of minimizing the risks that lawrelated activities of nonlawyers pose to the legal system without
prohibiting or even regulating those activities.
One possibility is that courts can play a crucial role in minimizing
the risks associated with nonlawyer legal assistance. Courts can protect the adjudicative process from the dangers of bad legal advice to
litigants, poor drafting of documents used in court, and ineffective
assistance in negotiations of settlements by providing in-court assistance to pro se litigants. 26 ' Similarly, before a case proceeds, judges
can explain the basic legal principles that will be used to decide the
case so that the pro se litigant will be less likely to present a case
based on inaccurate advice.262 Courts can also instruct pro se litigants
in basic court procedures to insure that litigants do not rely on misleading information.263
In addition, judges can question pro se litigants to determine
whether their goals are accurately represented in the documents they
258. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 (1998).
259. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963).
260. Id.
261. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987,
2011-21 (1999) (contending that courts may provide active assistance to unrepresented litigants without violating their duty of impartiality); McCulloch, supra note
13, at 504-08 (suggesting that advocates for court access for low-income persons direct
their efforts at establishing monitoring systems for all pro se litigants, not just the
poor).
262. See Engler, supra note 261, at 2028-31.
263. See id. at 2029.
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file. 26 They can give pro se litigants an opportunity to submit changes
and amendments if the documents do not appear to reflect the litigants' goals. Courts can also ask pro se litigants if they have received
nonlawyer legal assistance in drafting complaints, answers, motions, or
other documents, and can warn them if the documents appear to be
inadequate.265 In addition, courts can direct pro se litigants to legal
aid and pro bono programs when it appears that representation by a
lawyer is essential to the just determination of a case.
Courts can minimize the risks to the operation of the legal system
posed by nonlawyer assistance with negotiating settlements of pending litigation. Courts can review the settlement, inquire into the facts
of the case and the goals of the parties, and ask whether nonlawyers
other than the litigants participated in negotiating the settlement.
Moreover, a court can refuse to dismiss a case if the settlement appears to be unfair or oppressive. 66
While court involvement in the cases of pro se litigants may place a
burden on the time and resources of courts, the Constitution requires
this burden. Indeed, choosing the least restrictive means necessary to
protect the operation of the legal system makes it necessary for courts
to assume this extra burden to avoid curtailing First Amendment
rights. The next section considers Professor Rhode's third questionwho or what should make these determinations.
C.

Who Should Decide Whether and How to Regulate?

Fashioning an appropriate level of regulation depends on a balance
of the different interests which affect the operation of the legal system.
Courts are best suited to determine whether and how to regulate the
legal system. Indeed, courts must make the ultimate decision because
the proper operation of the legal system involves questions of constitutional law and requires determinations about the role of courts and
the rights of individuals. Moreover, the extent of the judicial power
and the standing of individuals to invoke judicial power are questions
traditionally reserved for the courts.26 7 The rights of organizations
and their members to vindicate legal interests through the courts are
determined by the First and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted
by the courts.
This Article's analysis of the risks and benefits of nonlawyer legal
activities to the operation of the legal system is not a sufficient foundation to determine whether a nonlawyer should have a constitutional
right to engage in any particular law-related activity. That determination also requires an examination of the potential for harm to the pub264.
265.
266.
267.

See id.
See id.
See id
See supra notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
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lic posed by the activity. There might also be other governmental
interests that justify restrictions. Nevertheless, the analysis in this Article suggests that regulation of some activities is necessary and regulation of other activities is suspect.
The courts appear to have a compelling interest in preventing the
misuse of judicial power by representatives who have access to the
power to conduct discovery, to compel witnesses to testify, and to
frame issues for courts to decide. Restricting these powers to lawyers
is likely to be the least restrictive means of providing meaningful access to justice for litigants while avoiding the misuse of judicial
power.26 8
On the other hand, it is not likely that rules prohibiting nonlawyers
from giving legal advice can survive constitutional scrutiny. 269 Between these poles are activities such as drafting wills and deeds, negotiating the settlement of claims, and representing litigants at docket
calls and pretrial hearings. Each activity should be analyzed to determine the least restrictive level of regulation that can survive judicial
review. Courts should repeal ethical rules that curtail First Amendment rights. Courts should be willing to invalidate state legislation
that is overbroad, vague, or not justified by the appropriate constitutional standard.
Courts are in the best position to regulate participation in the operation of the legal system by nonlawyers as well as lawyers. Courts
have the authority and the responsibility to take measures necessary
for the operation of the legal system.2 7 ° Courts have traditionally relied on the organized bar to propose changes in the regulation of the
practice of law, and as Professor Rhode observed, the bar has 2often
7 1 If
resisted changes that affected the interests of lawyers adversely.
the bar fails to act, courts should take the initiative in reforming the
regulation of nonlawyer activity to eliminate unconstitutional restrictions on speech and association. Courts and the bar should join efforts to involve nonlawyers in the administration of justice.
CONCLUSION

Ethical rules and legislation prohibiting unauthorized practice of
law will soon have to yield to the growing demand for access to the
268. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
270. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (holding that a federal court has the inherent power "to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct
which abuses the judicial process."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-363
(1966) (discussing a trial judge's responsibility to take measures necessary to conduct
a fair trial); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (noting the ancient
origin of the power to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice due to failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute).
271. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, supra note 26, at 705-706.
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legal system and to the constitutional rights of persons engaged in
nonlawyer legal assistance. The courts and the bar should reform regulations governing the practice of law to accommodate these
pressures.
Courts and the bar should begin an analysis of the governmental
interests involved in the operation of the legal system and the least
restrictive ways of meeting those governmental interests. They should
undertake a similar analysis of the governmental interests involved in
protecting the public from being harmed by persons engaged in lawrelated activities and the least restrictive means necessary to accomplish those interests. When the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of nonlawyers are at stake, courts should not prohibit the protected activities of nonlawyers if it is possible to achieve appropriate
governmental interests through less restrictive means. An analysis
that results in expanding the role of nonlawyers in the legal system
can contribute to the realization of the goal of equal access to justice.

Notes & Observations

